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Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price 








Within the framework of the common value model, we examine the magnitude of the difference in expected 
outcome between first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions. The study is limited to two empirical 
specifications of bidders’ signals: Weibull and normal distribution. The optimal bid functions and the expected 
procurer’s cost under both auction formats are derived. Simulations are undertaken to analyze the impact that 
random draws of signals have on the differences in outcome from the two auction formats. Using estimates 
from structural estimation in previous empirical work on first-price auction data, where Weibull and normal 
distributions of signals have been applied, the hypothetical expected gain from switching from a first-price 
sealed bid auction to a second-price sealed bid auction mechanism is computed.  
 
Keywords: Common value auctions, procurement, Vickrey auction 
JEL Classification: D44 (auctions)
                                                             
* I am indebted to Sören Blomquist, Matias Eklöf, Andreas Westermark and Anders Ågren for  their valuable 
comments. This work has been funded by grants from the Swedish Transport & Communications Research 
Board (Kommunikationsforskningsberedningen) and the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrens- 
verket).They are gratefully acknowledged. 
   2
1. Introduction 
Government procurement, which represents an important share of total government expenditure 
(typically 10–15% of GDP), is regulated by internationally agreed trade rules under the World 
Trade Organization.  Members of  the European Community (EC) must also  follow EC 
procurement directives. A cautious interpretation of these agreements and rules is that they 
restrict bidding to a sealed-bid procedure and do not allow the procurer to use open or 
sequential bidding mechanisms, such as the English auction.
1 The dominant bidding mechanism 
overall  seems to be the first-price sealed bid auction (first-price auction henceforth). From 
auction theory, however, we know that in some environments the second-price sealed bid 
auction (second-price auction henceforth) is at least as good or even better than the first-price 
auction in terms of the procurer’s expected cost. Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that if an 
affiliated auction model, such as the symmetric common value model, is used to describe a 
particular bidding environment, then the second-price auction yields a lower expected 
procurement cost than the first-price auction mechanism.  
In view of this theoretical result, the infrequent use of the second-price auction procedure in 
procurement auctions is somewhat puzzling. It is true that if we remove the assumptions of risk-
neutral bidders (firms), symmetry, and non-cooperative behavior, the first-price auction may be 
preferable to the second-price auction, but it is unlikely that this alone explains why second-
price auctions are rare.  Rothkopf et al.  (1990) consider various possible reasons for the 
scarcity of the second-price auction, some of which they find to be plausible. One such reason 
is that a bidder may be reluctant to bid his reservation cost if he fears that the procurer in a 
second-price auction will cheat by putting in imaginary bids to force the price below the 
                                                             
1 Article XIII:1–3 of the Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO) states that  ”the opportunities  
that may be given to tenderers to correct unintentional errors of form between the opening of tenders and the   
awarding of the contract shall not be permitted to give rise to any discriminatory practice,” and that  ”all 
tenders  
solicited  . . . shall be received and opened under procedures and conditions guaranteeing the regularity of the  
openings.”    3
second-lowest bid. Another is that by bidding its true cost a firm reveals valuable information 
which it might be important to keep secret if the firm anticipates that, in the event of winning the 
auction, it will have to negotiate with subcontractors, labor unions, or financial institutions. The 
authors find the argument that the rarity of the second-price auction could be due to inertia 
unpersuasive. Although institutions are slow to implement innovations, it seems unlikely that 
Vickrey’s result from the sixties could have passed unnoticed, without any measures being 
taken.  
Assuming that institutions have long  been familiar with the revenue-ranking of first- and 
second-price auctions, this paper sets out to explain part of the passivity of institutions in 
regard to adopting the second-price auction by examining the cardinal difference between the 
auction formats. It is important to consider the magnitude of the expected gain from switching 
auction procedures and not focus solely on the ordinal ranking of auction procedures. Although 
a switch from a first-price to a second-price auction yields an expected lower procurement 
cost, this gain may be regarded as too small to cover the implementation cost. The benefits have 
to be substantial in order to give up a well-tested and reliable procurement method for an 
untried mechanism.  
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have focused on bidding behavior in the 
symmetric first-price common value auction, given different empirical specifications of the 
distribution of bidders’ signals and the distribution of the true cost [e.g. Rothkopf (1969), 
Smiley (1979), Thiel (1988), Levin and Smith (1991), Paarsch (1992), Wilson (1992)]. Little 
work has, however, been devoted to deriving the explicit bid functions for the second-price 
auction and comparing the predicted outcome with that from the first-price auction, given the 
same underlying structure of cost and signals.  
In this paper we map the general symmetric bid functions of the first-price and second-price 
auctions onto two different assumptions regarding the distribution of the bidders’ signals: a   4
normal distribution and a   Weibull distribution. These are the only  distributions that to our 
knowledge have been applied to and estimated for first-price auction data with fairly good fit 
(Paarsch, 1992). Given the assumptions of the common value auction model, we can use these 
structural estimates to derive hypothetically the predicted gain of using the second-price auction 
instead.  
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 presents the bidding model for the 
first-price and second-price auction. In Section 3 and 4 the theoretical models are mapped onto 
the empirical specifications, and the optimal bid functions and the expected procurer’s cost are 
derived. In Section 5 we use estimates from the structural estimation in Paarsch (1992) on first-
price auction data to illustrate the procurer’s expected cost reduction by switching from a first-
price auction to a second-price auction procedure. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. The Model  
It is assumed that there are n risk-neutral bidders bidding for a particular contract, where the 
cost of carrying out the contract, c, is identical but unknown to all bidders prior to bidding. The 
bidder who submits the lowest bid is selected as the winner and awarded the contract. Before 
the auction, each bidder receives a private signal, zi, concerning the cost of the contract, which 
he uses to form an unbiased estimate of c, that is E(c|zi). No bidder knows the estimate of any 
other bidder. The bidders’ signals, zI, are positively correlated (affiliated) with a cumulative 
distribution function.  ( ) F z c | . The bidders have prior beliefs about the true cost, c, which is 
characterized by the cumulative distribution function,  ( ) G c . The number of bidders and the 
distribution functions of  zi and  c  are assumed to be common knowledge. In deriving the 
equilibrium strategies in both auctions, I focus on bidder i.  
   5
2.1 First-Price Sealed Bid Auction
2 
In the first-price auction, where the winning bidder is paid the amount of his bid to perform the 
task, the bidder, given his signal zi, sets his bid bi to maximize the expected payoff  
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is the posterior distribution of c;  b
-1( ) bi  is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy function of 








b | is the probability that bidder i wins the contract. 
Substituting (2) into (1), the maximization problem can be written as 
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which yields the first-order condition   
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Imposing symmetry among bidders,  ( ) b zi
* = b and rearranging the terms gives the first-order 
differential equation  
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where the constant, C, is determined by the appropriate boundary conditions.  
 
2.2 Second-Price Sealed Bid Auction
3  
                                                             
2 The derivation in this section is based on Paarsch (1992). Se also Wilson (1977). 
3 The derivation is based on Milgrom and Weber (1982).   6
In the second-price auction, where the winning bidder is paid the amount of the second-lowest 
bid to perform the task, the bidder’s expected payoff when its signal is zi and it bids an amount 
b is 
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where  ( ) [ ] c z y E C Z z Y y i i , | , = = = 1 , which is the expectation of the cost to bidder i when the 
signal received by him is z and the lowest signal among the other bidders is y. The second-last 
term in equation (6) denotes the conditional probability distribution function of the first-order 
statistics, that is, the smallest order statistics among the signals ( ) Z j i j| „ . Since c is increasing 
in its first arguments [for all  y z c z y c y y < - > , ( , ) ( , ) 0 and for all  y z c z y c y y > - < , ( , ) ( , ) 0] 
the integral is maximized by choosing b so that  b
- =
1( ) b z, or equivalently by choosing 
b z = b( ). Thus, symmetric equilibrium in a second-price auction is defined as     
                                                     ( ) ( ) b z c z z = , .                                                                      (7) 
Milgrom (1981) shows that this can be written as                 
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3. Bidding under Weibull Distributed Signals  
The bidder’s signal is drawn from a Weibull distribution, with the probability density function 
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The dispersion of  ( ) f z c i|  is related to the inverse of g2, that is, the higher the values of g2, the 
more concentrated the distribution. Further, it is assumed that  
                                                                 ( ) g c c ￿1
2 / .                                                          (10) 
Smiley (1979) shows that if  ( ) g c  is proportional to 1/ c
l  where l is a real number, then the 
symmetric equilibrium bid function is proportional to the signal; that is,  ( ) b r z z i i = , where 
( ) r  >1 is a constant of proportionality.  
Substituting (9) and (10) into Bayes’s rule, we obtain  
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Equation (11) shows that the posterior expected value is just the signal itself, that is, non-
informative. The bidder’s prior expectation about c does not shift the posterior expected value 
of c away from its signal zi . 
4   
                                                             
4 Making the assumption that  ( ) g c c ￿1/  gives  [ ] ( ) ( ) E c z z i i | / / = + - G G 1 1 1 1 2 2 g g    8
3.1 Optimal Bid Functions 
Substituting the distributional specifications into the general bid functions for the first-price and 
second-price sealed bid auctions, (5) and (8), the optimal bid functions are computed as  
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Figures 1a and 1b plot the optimal bid functions against the number of bidders, given g 2 5 = , 
and against different values of  g 2, given  n = 8. The figures illustrate two main predictions 
within the symmetric common value auction model: (i) the optimal bid in the first-price auction 
initially decreases with the number of bidders due to competition, but then, as the fear of the 
winner’s curse dominates the competitive effect, the bid increases with the number of bidders; 
(ii) an increased dispersion of signals (lower value of  g 2) gives rise to a higher adverse 
selection bias, which causes the bidder to adjust his bid upwards.  
 
Figure 1a: Optimal Bid versus Number of          Figure 1b: Optimal Bid versus Dispersion 
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3.2 Expected and Simulated Procurement Cost 
In order to rank the two auction formats in terms of lowest procurement cost, the expected 
winning bid  [ ] E w  in the first-price auction is compared with the expected second-lowest bid 
[ ] E b n ( : ) 2 in the second-price auction. Making use of 

























 procurer’s expected payment under both auction regimes is derived as  
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In table 1 the difference between (14) and (15) is computed for various number of bidders 
and  two sizes of the dispersion of signals.  By letting c=1, the procurer’s expected payment 
equals the constant of proportionality. 
 
                              Table 1: The procurer’s expected cost (c=1) 
 
The table shows that the difference between the constant of proportionality of the bid the 
procurer pays diminishes rapidly as the number of bidders increases. Increasing the dispersion 
             g 2 5 =                                                       g 2 10 =  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7) 
n  ( ) E w   ( ) E b n ( : ) 2   Diff.    ( ) E w   ( ) E b n ( : ) 2   Diff. 
2  1,25  1,081  0,169    1,111  1,040  0,072 
3  1,111  1,045  0,067    1,053  1,022  0,031 
4  1,071  1,031  0,041    1,034  1,015  0,019 
5  1,053  1,023  0,029    1,026  1,012  0,014 
10  1,023  1,011  0,012    1,011  1,005  0,006 
15  1,014  1,007  0,007    1,007  1,003  0,004 
20  1,011  1,005  0,005    1,005  1,003  0,003 
   10
of signals, i.e., lowering  g 2, drives up the difference in the procurer’s expected payment 
between the auction formats, but the magnitude of this difference is reduced to 1–3% when there 
are more than four bidders.  
To complete the picture of the differences in outcome between the two auction formats, a 
number of simulations are carried out. For a given number of  n bidders, n signals z are 
randomly drawn from the Weibull distribution and evaluated in the optimal bid functions of the 
two auction formats (equations 12 and 13). For each draw of n signals, we then compute the 
difference between the lowest bid in the first-price auction and the second-lowest bid in the 
second-price auction, that  is   
                                                            ( ) ( ) b b 1 2 2 st nd z z n n (1: ) ( : ) - .                                               (16) 
Setting  [ ] E c =1 throughout the simulations implies that  g 1is determined for a given value of 
g 2. I focus on two cases of dispersion of signals, 
( ) ( ) g g g g 2 2 5 06525 10 06073 = ﬁ = = ﬁ =   and  1 1 . . . The number of bidders ranges from 2 to 
20. Using the specifications above, each auction is simulated 10 000 times and the mean, the 
median and a 90% confidence interval are computed. The results from the simulations are 
presented in figures 2a and 2b. The computed mean values of the 10 000 simulated differences 
for a given number of bidders reflect the results in column four and column seven in table 1. 
Positive values show that the procurer’s cost is higher under the first-price auction. The median 
value of the difference in procurement cost is located above the mean value, indicating that the 
probability density of differences is concentrated well above zero.   11
 
Figures 2a-2b: Simulated Differences in Procurement Costs under Weibull Distributed   
                         Signals  
 





















































































































Table 2 illustrates the share of positive outcomes in the simulations, that is, the cases when the 
second-lowest bid in the second-price auction is lower than the lowest bid in the first-price 
auction. The decreasing ratio of positive outcomes supports our previous finding that the 
second-price auction is most advantageous with few bidders. 
 
Table 2: The probability of obtaining a lower cost under the second-price auction than 
under the first-price auction for various number of bidders.  
 
 
Removing 5% of the simulated differences in procurement costs in each tail of the distribution 
for every number of bidders, gives a 90% confidence interval with an upper and a lower bound.  
Number of bidders   2  3  4  5  10  15  20 
( ) ( ) b b
1 2 2 st nd z z n n (1: ) ( : ) >   76%  69%  66%  64%  62%  62%  62%   12
4. Bidding under Normally Distributed Signals 
An alternative approach to deriving a computationally tractable solution for b( ) z  is to assume 
that the signals are normally distributed with mean c and variance s
2 , and that the bidders have 
identical and diffuse prior distribution for the unknown cost c.  
Formally, the specifications of the distributions are denoted  
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(17) 
Again, using Bayes’s rule, we see that the bidder’s prior expectation about c does not shift the 
posterior expected value of c away from its signal zi. 
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4.1 Optimal Bid Functions 
Given the assumptions above and, additionally, the assumption that the estimation errors are 
normal and independent of the true cost, then Levin and Smith (1991), in a comment on Thiel 
(1988), show that the optimal bid function in the first-price auction can be derived as                    
                                           ( ) ( ) ( ) b z z z n n = = - + - b a s g x s exp : 1                                              (19) 
where 
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and 
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Levin and Smith show that individual rationality implies that g ‡ 0. Note that equation (20) is 
the expectation of the first order statistic in a sample of size  n of the standard normal 
distribution. The g is a parameter indexing the family of Nash equilibria, where one (g = 0) is 
linear in the estimate. In the case (g = 0), equation (19) turns into the linear form          
                                   ( ) s a b n z z b - = = .                                             (22) 
The corresponding optimal bid function in the second-price auction can be derived as
5 








.                    
(23) 
In figure 3 the optimal bids in both auction formats are plotted against the number of bidders.  
 











































































Again, the optimal bid in the first-price auction initially decreases with the number of bidders 
due to competition, but then, as the fear of the winner’s curse dominates the competitive effect, 
                                                             
5 See appendix for proof.   14
the bid increases with the number of bidders. From (22) and (23), it is also obvious that the 
optimal bid rises as the dispersion of signals increases.
6  
 
4.2 Expected and Simulated Procurement Cost 
As in the previous section, the difference in procurement cost between the first-price sealed bid 
and the second-price sealed bid auction is examined by comparing the expected winning bid in 
the first-price auction with the expected second-lowest bid in the second-price auction. The 
expected winning bid in the first-price auction and the second-lowest bid in the second-price 
auction are   
              (first-price auction)                 [ ] ( ) E w c n n = + - s x a (1: )                                            (24)  
             (second-price auction)            ( ) [ ]
( )
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2 for  . 
Thus, the difference between the two expected values can be expressed as a positive linear 
function in the dispersion of signals where the coefficient is determined by the number of 
bidders. In table 3 we have computed the difference between (24) and (25) for various number 
of bidders, where c = = 0 1  and s . 
                                                             
6 Note that |a|>|1/x(1:n)| for n > 2    15
 For small numbers of bidders the difference is significant, but the difference decreases rapidly 
as the number of bidders increases. 
 
                   Table 3: The procurer’s expected cost   (c=0 and s =1 ) 
 
Again, we complete the picture of the difference in outcome by randomizing the signals and 
evaluating the same set of signals in the optimal bid functions (22) and (23). For each given 
number of bidders, the corresponding number of signals are randomly drawn from the 
standardized normal distribution. In each simulated auction with the same number of bidders, 
the lowest bid in the first-price auction is compared with the second-lowest bid in the second-
price auction. Every auction for a given number of bidders is simulated 10 000 times.  
 
Figure 4: Simulated Differences in Procurement Costs under Normally Distributed   
















n  ( ) E w   ( ) E b n ( : ) 2   Diff. 
2  1,208  0,564  0,644 
3  0,661  0,326  0,335 
4  0,478  0,239  0,239 
5  0,385  0,193  0,192 
10  0,224  0,111  0,113 
15  0,173  0,085  0,088 
20  0,149  0,071  0,078   16
Figure 4 illustrates the mean, the median and a 90% confidence interval from the simulations. 
The procurer’s expected difference in cost between the auction formats converges to zero as the 
number of bidders increases.
7 For each number of bidders, we also examine the procurer’s 
probability of getting a lower cost with the second-price auction by counting the number of 
positive outcomes from the 10 000 simulations.  
 
Table 4: The probability of obtaining a lower cost under the second-price auction than 
under the first-price auction for various number of bidders 
 
 
Again, where there are very few bidder the second-price auction is very likely to generate a 
lower procurement cost than the first-price auction does, but with increased competition the 
superiority of the second-price auction decreases somewhat.  
 
5. A Numerical Example 
Paarsch (1992) examines whether bidding behavior in tree-planting contract auctions held in 
the province of British Columbia, Canada, can be explained by either the private values or the 
common value model. Using various  empirical specifications, Paarsch rejects the private 
values model and finds evidence consistent with rational behavior within the common value 
model, where both the Weibull distribution and the normal distribution specification of signals 
seem to fit the data fairly well.  
Given that bidders’ actions are consistent with theory when facing a second-price sealed bid 
auction, we may use the estimated structural parameters of the distribution of the signals in 
                                                             
7 Given the large number of simulations, one may regard  ( ) ( ) b
1 1 st z n : and  ( ) ( ) b
2 2 nd z n : as independent random 
variables. The difference in expected value then breaks down to  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s x x x 1 1 2 1 : : : / n n n - - , which converges 
to zero as n ﬁ¥. 
Number of bidders   2  3  4  5  10  15  20 
( ) ( ) b b
1 2 2 st nd z z n n (1: ) ( : ) >   79%  74%  71%  69%  68%  67%  67%   17
Paarsch (1992) to illustrate hypothetically what could be predicted to have been gained by the 
procurer by using the second-price sealed bid auction instead of the first-price sealed bid 
auction. The maximum likelihood estimates of t he structural parameters for the Weibull 
distribution and the normal distribution  c,g s 2 and   in Paarsch are reproduced in table 5. The 
estimates are based on the winning bids from 144 auctions. 
 




Making use of equations (14), (15), (22), and (23) the difference in expected costs between the 
first-price and the second-price auction for various numbers of bidders is presented in figure 5. 
Given the Weibull distribution, the estimated gain from a switch is relatively low, about 2–4% 
for auctions with few bidders and diminishing rapidly as the number of bidders increases. 
Parameter  Distribution 
Weibull            Normal  
c              0,224               0,20 
g 2              3,162                  – 
s                 –                   0,150 
 
n 
Mean          Min.              Max. 
15.57             3                  28 
a The parameters are for costs measured in dollars per tree planted   18
Figure 5: Expected Cost under the First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 
                (dollars per tree planted) 
 

















The difference in expected costs under the normal distribution exhibits a similar pattern, 
although the expected gains from a switch of auction format are somewhat higher.  
 
6. Summary  
This analysis of the magnitude of the expected difference between a first-price sealed bid 
auction and a second-price sealed bid auction is based on only two distributions of signals and 
costs, which of course limits the general value of this study. We have shown that the superiority 
of the second-price auction over the first-price auction in terms of expected procurer’s cost is 
related to changes in the number of bidders and the dispersion of signals. Given our 
distributions of signals and cost, the second-price auction is most beneficial when there are 
very few bidders or when there is high dispersion of bidders’ signals. The simulations also 
indicate that the probability of getting a better outcome when using the second-price auction, 
given a moderate number of bidders (>5), is about two-thirds. Making use of the results from 
Paarsch (1992), who finds the common value model consistent with observed behavior, we 
estimate that the predicted hypothetical gain of switching to the second-price auction may be 
significant for a small number of bidders (<5)  but is relatively low for a larger number of 
bidders.    19
The first-price sealed bid auction is a well-established mechanism in governmental 
procurement bidding. This mechanism was surely considered when the national acts and the 
international agreements on public procurement were formulated. Changing a procedure that is 
regarded as more or less formal requires resources. If the estimates of the costs and benefits of 
altering the procedure indicate that there is very little gain from switching methods, an 
institution may very well refrain from implementing the second-price auction. This argument 
seems especially to hold when the procurer expects that the number of potential bidders will be 
relatively large and that the dispersion of their signals will be small.  
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Appendix  
 
Optimal bid function with normally distributed signals
8 
 
(In what follows, the bidder’s signal is denoted x) 
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Restrictions that guarantee the existence of linear strategies: 
1) Each bidder’s prior distribution of value is diffuse: g(c) is constant for all c. 
2) Estimation errors are statistically independent of the contract’s true cost: 
( ) ( ) ( ) F X c c f X c c f X c i i i ' | | - = - = - . 
3)  Each bidder’s estimate of the cost is unbiased:  ( ) E X c i = . 
 
Note that 
( ) ( ) F x c f c d f t c dt f t dt F x c
x c x c x
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where t c = - t . The third equality is due to restriction 2.   
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8 The derivation is based on the derivation of the corresponding bid function under the first-price auction (see 
Levin and Smith, 1991).   22
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